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Tying and the Rule of Reason: 
Understanding Leverage, Foreclosure, and Price Discrimination 
Herbert Hovenkamp1 
Introduction 
Because most litigated tie-ins have not seemed to create or reinforce power in any 
market, their function may lie elsewhere.  This paper considers dominant firms use ties 
to exploit whatever power they already have over the tying product. Price discrimination 
is the most important means of doing so. It entered the debate not as a ground for 
condemnation but as a more innocent explanation for tying than foreclosure and 
“leverage.” Rather than expand or reinforce a defendant's power in any market, many 
ties merely provide a convenient way to price the tying product. Although a price-
discriminating tie might cover most purchasers of a tied product and thus foreclose a 
substantial share of the tied market, effective price discrimination neither requires nor 
typically generates a significant foreclosure or other impairment of the tied market's 
structure or performance. Further, similar price discrimination results can usually be 
achieved by means that are more socially costly. 
But should the tie that merely increases the exploitation of some customers be 
condemned on that account? This question is highly artificial, and the answer will not 
make much difference in many real cases. First, the tying seller may have no market 
power to exploit. In Jefferson Parish, for example, the tying seller was a hospital facing 
substantial competition and thus was probably unable to charge patients (or their 
sophisticated insurers) supracompetitive prices.2  Second, even a monopolist's tie-ins 
need not exploit any customer incrementally, for lawful non-tying vehicles will often have 
the same result.3Third, any incremental exploitation that does occur is sometimes more 
than offset by the distributional benefits enjoyed by those who pay less than the 
uniform, nondiscriminatory price that would otherwise prevail.4Fourth, that pure 
distributional issue is seldom presented because price typically affects output. Those 
who pay more usually purchase less, thereby depressing output and increasing the 
social cost of the defendant's power over the tying product. However, price 
discrimination often brings other customers lower prices than would otherwise prevail. 
The benefitted customers demand more, thereby increasing production and use and 
reducing the social cost of the defendant's power over the tying product. The net effects 
are often too indeterminate to count for or against tying, either generally or in particular 
cases. In the general run of cases, however, ties that facilitate price discrimination are 
more likely to increase welfare than reduce it.  Further, while it does not benefit every 
single customer, on balance it benefits more customers than it harms, and very likely by 
a greater amount. 
                                               
1 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
2Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); see 10 ANTITRUST ¶1733. 
3See, e.g., 9 ANTITRUST ¶1711b1-3 & e. Of course, the non-tying alternatives may be less effective. 
4See, e.g., id. at ¶1711b4 & f. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759552
Hovenkamp                                                  Tying, Leverage, Foreclosure                                             March, 2011, page 2 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, while antitrust law aims primarily at practices that suppress rivalry, it 
can also address the identifiable practice, if any, that always or nearly always exploits 
consumers incrementally and overall and that does so without serving any legitimate 
functions. This is clearest when production and use are also likely to be affected. 
The courts have not focused on this issue or deliberated on its answer. Some courts 
simply assume that consumer exploitation brought about by price discrimination ties is 
anticompetitive.5 By contrast, the Supreme Court's Jefferson Parish decision seems to 
say that mere exploitation of customers is not grounds for worrying about tying.6 The 
opinion repeatedly emphasized tying law's object of preventing impairment of 
competition in the tied market, apparently to the exclusion of any other concern. The 
Court seemed indifferent to the exploited buyer made to take an unwanted product. 
[W]hen a purchaser is “forced” to buy a product he would not 
have otherwise bought even from another seller in the tied-product 
market, there can be no adverse impact on competition because no 
portion of the market which would otherwise have been available to 
other sellers has been foreclosed.7 
In an earlier passage, the Jefferson Parish Court also suggested, with some 
ambiguity, that tying law ignored mere exploitation of customers: 
[1] [T]he law draws a distinction between the exploitation of 
market power by merely enhancing the price of the tying product, 
on the one hand, and by attempting to impose restraints on 
competition in the market for a tied product, on the other. [2] When 
the seller's power is just used to maximize its return in the tying 
product market, where presumably its product enjoys some 
justifiable advantage over its competitors, the competitive ideal of 
                                               
5Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982) 
(finding no price discrimination in this case but suggesting that “[t]ying arrangements are viewed with 
disfavor [and] … prohibited because they are thought to facilitate price discrimination”), citing Moore v. 
Jas. H. Matthews & Company, 550 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1977). 
Curiously, the Hirsh court declared simultaneously that “leverage” objections have largely been 
discredited because ties do not generally alter the single monopoly profit inherent in the tying product. 
The court apparently disaggregated the several senses of “leverage” into (1) possibly greater profit when 
tied and tying products are used in fixed proportions, (2) price discrimination when those products are 
used in variable proportions, and (3) possible effects on entry into the tied or tying markets. The court 
dismissed the first but emphasized the second and third as evils, failing to see that such use-intensity price 
discrimination can ordinarily be achieved in other ways, as Judge Schwarzer pointed out in Casey v. Diet 
Center, 590 F. Supp. 1561, 1570 & n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (tie exploited franchisees no more than a 
“variable royalty based on a percentage of [the franchisee's] revenue”). Casey also noted that price 
discrimination need not be economically harmful at all. Ibid.  Along with Hirsh, see Byars v. Bluff City 
News Company, 609 F.2d 843, 861 (6th Cir. 1979) (price discrimination an evil of tying) and Martino v. 
McDonald's Systems, 625 F. Supp. 356, 359 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (suggesting that price discrimination reveals 
“the extension of market power” into the market for the tied product);  
6See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. 2; see 10 ANTITRUST ¶1733. 
7Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16. 
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the Sherman Act is not necessarily compromised. [3] But if that 
power is used to impair competition on the merits in another 
market, a potentially inferior product may be insulated from 
competitive pressures. [4] This impairment could either harm 
existing competitors or create barriers to entry of new competitors 
in the market for the tied product, and [5] can increase the social 
costs of market power by facilitating price discrimination, [6] thereby 
increasing monopoly profits over what they would be absent the 
tie.8 
Until clauses #5 and #6, the Court seems to approve increased profits that merely 
reflect preexisting power over the tying product. Even those clauses absolve profits that 
could have been obtained without the tie. To be sure, the reference in clause #6 to profit 
that could not otherwise be obtained might condemn incremental profit above that which 
could be obtained from non-tying price discrimination. However, it follows clause #5, 
which refers to “greater social cost of market power,” which seemingly refers to the 
possible output effects of price discrimination9 and which flows in clause #4 from the 
impairment of competition in the tied market through harm to existing rivals or new entry 
there. These passages from Jefferson Parish suggest indifference to the tie that merely 
helps exploit preexisting power in the tying market without worsening market structure 
or raising “social cost” by reducing output.  
In Illinois Tool, whose holding was that market power would not be presumed from 
the mere fact that the tying product is patented, the Supreme Court discussed price 
discrimination only briefly.2  The Court concluded that the presence of price 
discrimination, just as the presence of the patent, was not sufficient to warrant an 
inference of market power.  The Court observed that “it is generally recognized that 
[price discrimination] occurs in fully competitive markets.”3  It thus implicitly concluded 
that price discrimination itself would not serve to condemn a tie.  In Sheridan the 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged as much.  The court observed that tying can facilitate 
price discrimination and extract more revenue from more intense users.  Nevetheless, 
“price discrimination does not violate the Sherman Act unless it has an exclusionary 
effect.  And a monopolist doesn’t have to actually take over the market for the tied 
product in order to discriminate….”4 
                                               
8Id. at 14–15 (numbered references added; citations and footnotes omitted). The bulk of the 
references in the Court's footnotes emphasized not only that tying may be adopted to achieve price 
discrimination but that such discrimination can sometimes produce socially desirable results. See 9 
ANTITRUST ¶1711. 
9See 9 ANTITRUST ¶1711 for the difference between output effects and incremental exactions from 
some customers. 
2 Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (to the extent it is relevant, 
HH was consulted by the defendant). 
3 Id. at 44, citing 9 ANTITRUST ¶1711 in the previous edition and WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374–75 (2003); William J. 
Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: 
Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 666 (2003). 
4Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LLC, 530 F.3d 590, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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Incremental Exploitation as Detriment 
Indifference to incremental exploitation in judging ties would rest on the general legal 
permission for the otherwise lawful holder of monopoly power to charge whatever the 
traffic will bear—including such discrimination as the market allows through metering 
and similar devices.10 Several, but not all, rationales for that well-established permission 
might indicate an absolute “entitlement” to exploit such power via any vehicle that 
antitrust law does not already condemn on other grounds. Other rationales are 
consistent with prohibiting an identifiable class of conduct, if any, that always or usually 
intensifies monopolistic exploitation without benefiting any customers or the economy, 
and thus that does not require an antitrust tribunal to judge the reasonableness of actual 
prices or output. 
The clearest reason for not trying to control a monopolist's price directly is 
uncertainty about the proper price. Without guides to propriety, it seems unfair to punish 
a firm for charging a price that a tribunal later judges to have been excessive. Moreover, 
the tribunal itself is ill-equipped to determine the reasonable price and repeatedly to 
redetermine it as supply and demand conditions change. Antitrust courts have rightly 
abjured that role.11 
However, our inability or unwillingness to transform such tribunals into price-control 
agencies does not prevent us from condemning an identifiable practice that always, or 
even typically, exploits some consumers without benefitting others or the economy, thus 
dispensing with any assessment of prices in particular cases. 
Suppressed Rivalry, Incentives and Legitimate Rewards 
The competitive impulses that antitrust law promotes derive not only from the fear of 
losing out to rivals but also from the hope of outcompeting them in order to enjoy excess 
profits as the fruit of “superior skill, foresight, and industry” or “business acumen.”12 The 
hope of excess returns inspires the rivalry that antitrust law favors. Although such profits 
might result from luck, entry barriers, or rivals' incompetence, we cannot usually 
distinguish the source and want to encourage the pursuit of excess gains through 
desirable behavior. Preserving those incentives seems entirely consistent with confining 
the focus of antitrust law to improper behavior creating or maintaining market power, 
while leaving those who obtain power by proper means to enjoy its fruits. Similarly, 
although the policy of granting monopolies to encourage invention has not validated 
every patent license restraint that might enhance the patentee's rewards, the illicit 
restraints have primarily been those that limit otherwise possible competition with the 
patentee, not those that merely increase its returns.13 
 
 
                                               
10See 3A ANTITRUST ¶¶720, 721. 
11See id. at ¶720. 
12The quoted phrases are from, respectively, United States v. Aluminum Company, 148 F.2d 416, 430 
(2d Cir. 1945), and United States v. Grinnell Corporation, 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
13See, e.g., 9 ANTITRUST ¶1701a–b. 
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Higher Tied Product Prices with Neither Injury to Rivals 
nor Higher Consumer Prices 
The least warrant for antitrust intervention occurs when higher tied product prices fail 
to result from foreclosure of rivals and are not reflected in higher consumer prices. For 
example, most franchise ties (1) fail to foreclose any rival from anything because the 
tied product is a common ingredient or other input into franchising; (2) fail to result in 
higher consumer prices because the franchise's business is in competition with other 
businesses, both franchised and unfranchised. 
The franchise tying cases, which are discussed in detail elsewhere,14 have a set of 
ingredients that are common to nearly all of them. First, The plaintiffs are franchisees 
rather than end-use consumers, and the market share of the franchise as a whole is far 
too small to warrant any conclusions that consumers pay more because of the tie. 
Second, rival businesses are not foreclosed from anything by the tie, generally for two 
reasons. (1) because the franchisor lacks significant power in any market; and (2) 
because the tied products are usually common inputs such as herbs and spices,15 the 
rental of a common building or other restaurant site,16 pizza dough made from ordinary 
ingredients,17 or cookies or other common food products.18Third, the only high price is 
that paid by the franchisee, and thus the dispute almost always reduces being one 
between the franchisor and franchisee about the size of the franchise fee. That may of 
course be a contract problem, may involve fraud in the case of the franchisee who was 
deceived into signing an unfavorable agreement, or may implicate a state franchisee 
protection statute.19 Interfering with contract prices, however, is not the job of antitrust 
tribunals. 
The Queen City Pizza decision illustrates this.20 The plaintiffs were franchisees of 
Domino's Pizza, the franchisor and defendant. The plaintiffs complained that Domino's 
required franchisees to purchase the various ingredients for pizzas, particularly pizza 
dough mix, from Domino's own subsidiary at significantly higher prices than the 
franchisees might pay alternative vendors. To be sure, the plaintiff may have had a 
contract dispute with its franchisor about whether it was required to purchase Domino's 
dough or other supplies. Also, Domino's was very likely using higher prices on dough to 
“meter” the franchisee's sales as a way of collecting the franchise fee, and it is certainly 
possible that Domino's was attempting to charge a larger franchise fee than it had 
                                               
14On power issues, see 2B ANTITRUST ¶519. 
15Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43, 46–47 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). 
16E.g., Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 
(1981). 
17E.g., Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1059 
(1998). 
18Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, 980 F. Supp. 1252 (M.D. Ga. 1997). 
19See generally 2B ANTITRUST ¶519. 
20Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, note 17. See 
also Maris Distributing Company v. Anheuser-Busch Incorporated, 302 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1190 (2003), which overruled the Collins decision, and embraced the reasoning of the 
Third Circuit in the Queen City Pizza case. 
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charged at some earlier period in this franchise arrangement. 
But high contract prices alone do not form the basis of an injury to competition 
unless sales in the market for the contracted-for product are reduced. In this case there 
was no allegation that the Domino's pizza dough tie-in had any measurable effect at all 
on the markets for flour, salt, baking powder, or other ingredients that might go into 
pizza dough. To be sure, there may have been alternative sellers who wished to sell 
pizza dough to Domino's franchisees but were prevented by the franchise contract, but 
injury to competition would occur only if these contracts denied these rival sellers 
access to a significant portion of that market. This was not alleged and, in any event, 
seems unreasonable on its face. Even a very large franchisor such as Domino's 
consumed only a trivial portion of the nation's flour and salt. As long as the rivals have 
an ample market in which to sell their dough or equivalent products made from the 
same ingredients and processes, there is no injury to competition. 
Further, as long as Domino's is a competitor in the pizza business, retail customers 
cannot be injured by the tie. To the extent Domino's franchisees pass off higher priced 
dough via higher pizza prices, customers will turn to other pizza sellers, whose dough 
makers will in fact be benefitted rather than injured by Domino's high dough prices. 
“Pure” leveraging without foreclosure or price discrimination: 
Exclusive dealing distinguished 
 
Early on some courts adopted a “leverage” theory that a tie could harm 
consumers by forcing them to pay a monopoly price for a “tied” product even in the 
absence of foreclosure.  These courts largely did not recognize the possibility of price 
discrimination.5  For example, in the Carbice decision, an early patent “misuse” case, 
the Supreme Court condemned an arrangement under which the seller of a patented ice 
box required those who used it to purchase its dry ice as well. The tie was 
nonforeclosing, since dry ice, which occurred naturally and was readily manufactured, 
was not patentable.6 Nevertheless, Justice Brandeis wrote, the requirement was an 
unlawful leveraging of the ice box patent because it enabled the patentee to “derive its 
profit not from the invention on which the law gives it a monopoly, but from the unpatented 
supplies with which it is used.”7 If a monopoly could be contractually expanded in this way, 
a patentee “might conceivably monopolize the commerce in a large part of the unpatented 
materials used in its manufacture. The owner of a patent for a machine might thereby 
secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented supplies consumed in its operation.”8 
                                               
5 On price discrimination ties, see 9 ANTITRUST ¶1711. 
6Dry ice had been discovered in the 1830s by Charles Thilorier, a French chemist, as the residue from 
rapid evaporation of liquid carbon dioxide. See Duane H.D. Roller, Thilorier and the First Solidification 
of a “Permanent Gas (1835), 43 Isis 109 (1952). 
7 Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931). 
8. Id. 
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This “pure” leveraging theory that does not require either foreclosure nor price 
discrimination rests on a simple economic fallacy that a firm can earn greater profits by 
charging more than its “profit-maximizing” price.  The producer of an ice box that used dry 
ice as a refrigerant would charge a price for the box that already reflected any market 
power that it might possess.  This price would thus already reflect the existing market price 
of the dry ice itself, because customers require the box/dry ice combination.  As a result, a 
seller could tie dry ice and sell it at a monopoly price only by cutting the price of the ice 
box, or else its price would rise above the profit-maximizing level.9  The Bowman article 
repudiating the theory indicated that most of the ties to which courts had applied the theory 
were instances of price discrimination, and that tying of this sort typically involved a price 
cut in the tying product and a price increase in the tied product.  The subsequent case law 
has borne this out.10 
This fear of “pure” leveraging, without foreclosure and without an articulated 
concern about price discrimination, largely accounts for the development of the per se rule 
against tying in the 1940s and 1950s.  Because it did not require proof of foreclosure, 
structural analysis such as that applied in rule of reason cases was believed unnecessary.  
This form of the leverage theory also explains why exclusive dealing, covered by the same 
section of the Clayton Act, developed a rule of reason analysis even though exclusive 
dealing often has greater exclusionary force than does tying.  For example, while tying 
might foreclose rivals from selling a particular tied product, exclusive dealing typically 
excludes them from the defendant’s entire line.11  In exclusive dealing cases, unlike tying, 
the courts did not see the “leveraging” of two related products by requiring that they be 
purchased from the same seller. 
Several conclusions emerge. First, there is a modest though not compelling case for 
condemning a class of conduct if it always or usually exploits some consumers 
incrementally without benefitting other consumers with lower prices or expanded output, 
even when the conduct has no other detrimental effects. As we shall see later, tie-based 
price discrimination does not satisfy this prerequisite for general condemnation because 
it can often be achieved equally well by other means, and it is as likely as not to benefit 
other consumers with lower prices and the economy with expanded output.  The pure 
“leverage” theory, which assumed that all customers could be exploited even in the 
absence of foreclosure, never withstood careful analysis. 
Second, antitrust law does not and should not require an assessment of prices and 
output in the particular case unless the evidence is very strong. This principle generally 
                                               
9 This leverage theory was initially exploded by Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage 
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 21–23 (1957); see also Richard Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity and the 
Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967). 
10 See 9 ANTITRUST ¶1711b; see Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and 
Competitive Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 942 & n.77 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284; Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse and 
Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475 (2011), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474407.  For a generally contrary view, see Einer 
Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 397 (2009). 
11 See 11 ANTITRUST ¶¶1800, 1802, 1820, 1821. 
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precludes examining the actual output and prices associated with a particular 
defendant's tie-in.  In any event, none of the theories about how tying harms competition 
have attempted this.  The pure leverage theory simply assumed that the price of a tying 
combination was higher than the price of separately sold components.  To the extent 
that assumption has been subjected to theoretical assessment or verification it is false, 
particularly in situations where the secondary market is not perfectly competitive.  The 
price discrimination theory does not currently have the tools to assess individual 
price/output effects.  Price discrimination ties benefit some customers and may injure 
others.  Overall welfare effects are very likely positive but impossible to measure in 
particular cases.  Foreclosure theories rely on traditional antitrust structural analysis 
rather than direct measurement of price/output effects. 
Third, it is important not to confuse “leverage” and “foreclosure.”  The court were 
often ambiguous, speaking of the leveraging of a second “monopoly” in the tied product, 
without distinguishing between higher prices themselves or actual exclusion.  By losing 
sight of this distinction the courts began treating tying harshly even though it involved 
tied products that were ordinary commodities in which actual market exclusion was 
impossible. 
Although society would lose little by condemning the tie that merely increases the 
exploitation of some customers (if we could identify the case), it would also gain little 
when exploitation beyond that achievable though lawful alternative is relatively rare. 
Moreover, any such exploitation of some customers may accompany benefits for other 
customers—such as those who receive the lower of two discriminatory prices—so that 
net exploitation is rarer still. Furthermore, the incremental revenues that impel a seller to 
use a tie may often result from increased production and use. 
Tying and Price Discrimination 
Tying came to be feared as a device by which a seller “levered” power over a tying 
product into power over a tied product.1 That fear accounts for the law’s early hostility 
toward tying arrangements. In fact, however, the tied product in many litigated cases 
has often been a staple item, such as dry ice, paper or salt. Because the predominant 
uses of the staple were elsewhere, the tying seller had no expectation of power in the 
tied market, so commentators began several decades ago to explore alternative 
motivations for tying. They identified price discrimination as a likely explanation for 
many ties.2 Instead of gaining power or otherwise affecting competition in the tied 
market, a tying seller uses the tie simply to maximize its revenues from the tying product 
through price discrimination.3 
                                               
1See 9 ANTITRUST ¶¶1701, 1710. 
2E.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 215–16 (rev. ed. 1952); Ward S. Bowman, Tying 
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 23–24 (1957); Meyer Burstein, A Theory of 
Full Line Forcing, 55 NW. L. REV. 62 (1960). Other literature is summarized in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §10.6e (4th ed. 2011) and 
FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID M. ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE ch. 13 (3d ed. 1990). 
3For additional routes by which a tie helps exploit preexisting power over the tying product, see 9 
ANTITRUST ¶1712. 
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The defendant would use ties to facilitate price discrimination only when it thereby 
increases its own profits. Although that increment might represent a mere transfer of 
wealth from some customers to the defendant, its source might also be an expansion of 
sales at more competitive prices to lower-value users of the tying product. Common 
forms of discrimination, including tying, are likely to have that beneficial result. We can 
conclude mainly that the detriments of price discrimination are not so surely harmful in 
the generality of cases to support absolute illegality for tying. Moreover, it seems very 
doubtful that judges and juries can assess the net impact of a particular price 
discrimination tie on production and use relative to output at the prices that would have 
prevailed in the absence of any discrimination. The social value of guessing about such 
matters is also doubtful when similar effects are likely to result from lawful, non-tying 
methods of discrimination. In sum, price discrimination is not a warrant for condemning 
a tie that is not objectionable on other grounds. 
Utility and Prerequisites of Price Discrimination 
Suppose that a monopolist has constant costs of $1 per unit and three customers, 
each of whom desires one unit of the product and is willing to pay up to $5, $2, and $1, 
respectively, for it. If unable to discriminate, the monopolist will sell one unit for $5, 
earning $4 profit; at lower prices it will sell more but earn less. With “perfect” 
discrimination, it will sell one unit at each price, yielding $8 revenue and $5 profit. 
Without discrimination, only the highest-value customer would receive the product in 
this example. By contrast, perfect (first degree) discrimination expands output to the 
perfectly competitive level, bringing the product to the customer who is just willing to pay 
its cost of production and thus benefitting society. The benefit is unequivocal here 
because this discrimination forces no one to pay any more than it would have to pay in 
its absence; even the highest-value customer pays only the $5 that a nondiscriminating 
seller would charge. This is not always true, for we shall see later that discrimination 
can extract more from some customers than the uniform price that would otherwise 
prevail. The immediate point is that discrimination may bring production and use closer 
to the competitive level and may sometimes do this without even exploiting the highest-
value users. 
This simple example also shows three prerequisites for successful discrimination. 
First, the seller must possess some degree of market power. This can be readily 
explained. The lower of the discriminatory prices must equal or exceed marginal cost or 
else it would be unprofitable. Therefore, the higher price must exceed such costs and 
could not be maintained were there intense competition.4 Second, the seller must be 
able to identify those who are willing to pay the higher price. Third, the seller must be 
able to prevent those who buy at the low price from reselling to those asked to pay more 
(“arbitrage”). Subsequent illustrations will show how tying arrangements can identify 
customers valuing the tying product more highly and can also prevent low-price buyers 
from undermining the discrimination. 
Though serving to implement price discrimination, a tie might, of course, foreclose 
                                               
4See 2B ANTITRUST ¶517, which notes, however, that the amount of power needed to support price 
discrimination can be extremely small. 
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enough of the tied market to affect competition there.5 Because no foreclosure is 
needed to bring about price discrimination, it can be appraised independently of any 
foreclosure effect or threat. 
The most common discrimination produced by variable-proportion tying—namely, of 
charging customers differently according to the intensity with which they use a product -
- is a form of second degree price discrimination.  Tie-ins have been used for this 
purpose along with many alternative devices of undoubted legality. Although we cannot 
be absolutely sure of price discrimination's effects, this “metering” function of price 
discrimination is likely to expand production and use of the tying product and thereby to 
improve resource allocation. This benefit, together with the benefit to the low-price 
customers, offsets the possible loss of consumer surplus to the high-price customers. 
The discussion below also explains why price discrimination accomplished through 
tying does not inefficiently transfer output from higher value to lower value customers, 
thus answering one objection that has been stated against it.  While that is a 
characteristic of third degree price discrimination, nearly all variable proportion ties 
represent instances of second degree discrimination, although a few may incorporate 
both types of discrimination. 
Tying and “Degrees” of Price Discrimination 
Since early in the twentieth century economists have classified price 
discrimination into three types, or “degrees,” which can involve significantly different 
practices, and with significantly different effects.  In first degree price discrimination, 
sometimes called “perfect” price discrimination, a seller is able to identify the maximum 
customer willingness to pay for each unit of each good that it is selling.  Output under 
first degree price discrimination is the same as under competition, but there is no 
consumer surplus at all.  Because sellers can rarely identify buyer willingness to pay 
with such precision, first degree price discrimination is rare to nonexistent in the real 
world.  One example that comes close is the so-called Dutch auction, in which the 
auctioneer starts with a very high price and then announces lower prices until a bidder 
accepts.  Assuming the complete absence of strategic behavior, such an auction would 
claim very close to each buyer’s reservation price on each sale.12 
By contrast second degree price discrimination occurs when sellers are unable to 
make ex ante judgments about buyer willingness to pay, but can make observations 
relating customer behavior of various kinds to willingness to pay.  The most common 
example is the quantity discount, which gives lower prices to purchasers of larger 
amounts.  But there are also arrangements such as airline classes of seats, which 
permits passengers to select a price based on amenities.  To the extent that the price is 
not proportional to cost differences between the classes of service, the seller is price 
                                               
5See 9 ANTITRUST ¶¶1704–1707. 
12 An ordinary auction does not have this result because the winning bidder might have been willing 
to bid even more, thus leaving some consumer surplus with the buyer.  See Johannes Horner & Larry 
Samuelson, Managing Strategic Buyers (SSRN Working Paper, Sept. 8, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673898. 
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discriminating.  Most two part tariffs are a form of second degree price discrimination.  
In such a scheme the seller charges a fixed fee for “entry” plus a fee for use.  For 
example, a car rental company might charge $25 per day plus 30 cents a mile for a 
rental car.  Or an electric utility might charge a $35 per month “base” fee, plus 20 cents 
per kilowatt hour.  Depending on how the fee is structured the seller can obtain different 
rates of return from buyers who use more or fewer variable units. 
A variable proportion tying arrangement is a form of second degree price 
discrimination.  The seller typically offers a “fixed,” or durable product at a price that is 
lower than the free standing price it could otherwise charge.  However, then it ties some 
good that is used in varying amounts by different buyers.  For example, a seller with 
some market power in its computer printer might have a “standalone” market price of 
$100.  Ink cartridges might be sold competitively at a price of $10.  The printer maker 
might then charge $70 for the printer, which is its cost or less, and tie ink cartridges at a 
price of $20.  If a printer user consumers 3 cartridges over the life of the printer the 
manufacturer breaks even on this deal, but it earns more from printer users who use 
more than 3 cartridges. 
In this illustration the printer/cartridge tie has three quite different effects.  
Customers who consume more than 3 cartridges are worse off.  Customers who would 
have purchased the printer anyway but who consume fewer than three cartridges are 
better off.  In addition, however, the price reduction in the printer from $100 to $70 
brings additional customers into the printer market who would not otherwise have 
purchased.  While customers in the first class are injured by the arrangement, 
customers in the second two classes are benefitted.13 
That this theory explains many if not most variable proportion ties seems fairly 
clear.  One unfortunate consequence of the per se rule against tying is that courts have 
not made consistent records on the question of how tying defendants allocate the price 
between the tying and tied good.  Those cases that report the price, however, are 
virtually uniform that the tying product price was cut to a lower level than it would 
otherwise have been sold, often to cost or below,14 and sometimes even to zero.15 
                                               
13See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Competitive Harm, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284. 
 
14 See Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (printer/ink tie 
– “As is true of other printer manufacturers, Xerox generally sells its printers at a low margin or a loss, 
hoping to earn a profit through later sales of high margin ink”).  Among the earliest cases involving 
variable proportion ties, see Henry v. A.B. Dick Company, 224 U.S. 1 (1912), where the patentee sold its 
mimeograph machine at less than its costs but tied ink, stencils, and other supplies and assessed a high 
markup on those. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Henry, 149 F. 424, 425 (C.C.N.Y. 1907) (“The evidence 
establishes that the complainants sell the machines at a loss, less than the actual cost of making, relying 
on sales of supplies therefor for a profit. The complainants have sold about 11,000 of these machines 
under this license restriction.”); Heaton Peninsula Button Fastening Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 
288, 289 (6th Cir. 1896) (button fastening machine sold at “actual cost to the maker, they expecting a 
profit on their monopoly alone from the sale of fasteners or staples to those having the machine.”);  
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Finally, third degree price discrimination occurs when a seller is able to identify 
customer classes ex ante and charge these classes different prices based on perceived 
willingness to pay.  For example, a seller might charge different prices to commercial 
and residential users.16   Third degree price discrimination has one unique characteristic 
that may magnify any harm that it causes: it creates a “discontinuity” in demand that 
                                                                                                                                                       
Cortelou v. Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., 138 F. 110 (C.C.N.Y. 1905), rev’d, 145 F. 933 (2d Cir. 1906) 
(tie of  patented duplicating machine to stencils: “The evidence is that the present selling price of the 
rotary neostyle machine is $50, but that its cost to the manufacturer is about $64.”); see also Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917) (noting patentee’s argument 
that the public benefitted “by the sale of the machine at what is practically its cost”); Static Control 
Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (printer manufacturer received 
lower price for cartridges subject to a restriction requiring a single use and replacement with another Lexmark 
cartridge than if sold without the restriction).  In other literature, see Tony Smith, “Xbox 360 costs third more 
to make than it sells for,” THE REGISTER (Nov. 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/11/24/xbox360_component_breakdown/ (last visited July 20, 2009) 
(noting Microsoft’s strategy of below cost sale of hardware game box, accompanied by high prices for 
Microsoft’s own games plus royalty rates on license fees from independent game producers). In marketing 
this is sometimes called razor + blade pricing, and it applies to goods that are tied by technological 
incompatibility as well as those that are contractually tied. See Wesley R. Hartmann & Harikesh S. Nair, 
Retail Competition and the Dynamics of Consumer Demand for Tied Goods (Stanford Business School 
Working Paper, Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1085009; 
see also Richard Gil & Wesley R. Hartmann, Why Does Popcorn Cost so Much at the Movies? An 
Empirical Analysis of Metering Price Discrimination (Stanford Univ. Graduate School of Business 
Research Paper, Jan. 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088451 
(movie theaters tie concession food products by prohibiting attendees from bringing in their own; high 
food prices are offset by lowered admission prices); see Christopher Soghoian, Caveat Venditor: 
Technologically Protected Subsidized Goods and the Customers who Hack Them, 6 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 46 (2007) (providing several examples, focusing on technological ties). 
 
See Edward Iacobucci, A Switching Costs Explanation of Tying and Warranties, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 
431 (2008) (describing strategies of using low foremarket prices compensated by high aftermarket prices). 
 
15 See, e.g., Kentmaster Mfg. Co. v. Jarvis Prods. Corp., 146 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 1998), amended, 164 F.3d 
1243 (9th Cir. 1999) (defendant provided durable meat cutting equipment at no charge to meat cutters, but 
charged higher prices for aftermarket parts).   Compare  a common distribution mechanism of soft drink 
dispensing machines, which provides the machines to owners of locations where vending occurs at a price of 
zero, but the machine may stock only that supplier’s brand of soft drinks. See Vending Solutions, Coca-Cola 
Vending Machine, http://www.vendingsolutions.com/coke-vending-machines/ (Coca-Cola; free 
dispensing machine to plant locations containing forty employees or more, but only Coca-Cola products 
can be dispensed in the machine).  Among franchise ties, see Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 
(9th Cir. 1971) (franchisor charged no franchising fee or royalty, but required franchisees to purchase tied 
products at higher-than-market prices). 
 
16E.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (licensing of technology to 
produce sound amplifiers at different rates to producers for commercial use and for home use); ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (licensing of database to commercial and residential users at 
different rates); see Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MARYLAND L. REV. 616 
(2008). 
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effectively transfers sales from higher to lower value customers and as a result destroys 
some consumer surplus.  For example, suppose that a software producer charges $400 
to businesses for use of its software, but only $200 to noncommercial buyers.  A 
prospective commercial buyer willing to pay $399 for the software would not buy it; 
however, a home user willing to pay no more than $201 would.  Re-assigning this unit 
from the commercial buyer to the homeowner reduces total consumers’ surplus by 
$198.17  As a result of this phenomenon economists have been able to show that third 
degree price discrimination that does not increase total output necessarily reduces 
consumer welfare (surplus).18  This is not the case of second degree price 
discrimination. 
The economic literature generally deals with variable proportion ties as second-
degree price discrimination.S18 First of all, as noted above, third-degree price 
discrimination involves a seller’s prior segregation of groups of customers based on 
willingness to pay.S19 Tying does not; rather, the tying firm selects the products and 
places them on the market, with the same price schedule to all. Customers identify 
themselves by selecting the portion of the schedule that they want.  Further, there is no 
transfer of output from high value to low value buyers.  For example, in the printer/ink 
cartridge tie illustration every customer who values the printer by $70 or more 
purchases one, and purchases cartridges to the point that the value they place on an 
additional cartridge falls below $20.  “At the margin” all customers are treated alike and 
receive the same incremental value from the product. 
                                               
17 Of course, in the case of a product such as software or the patent license in General Talking 
Pictures, marginal cost is very likely extremely low, perhaps close to zero.  In the case of nonrivalrous 
goods such as licenses generally, sales to one person do not subtract from the availability of the good to 
others.   In that case, a unit is not exactly “reassigned” from high value to low value customers the way a 
costly item produced under capacity constraints, such as a truck or refrigerator, would be.  The number of 
units sold to high value users very likely has little impact on the number available to lower value users, 
and vice-versa.  The price discrimination is just a tool for maximizing profits within each grouping.  See 
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING 
LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, ch. 1 (2011). 
18 E.g., Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare 
Result , 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259 (Dec. 1990); Richard Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of 
Monopolistic Third-degree Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1981); Hal R. Varian, Price 
Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 600 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. 
Willig, eds., 1989); see also ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, II.17.6 (4th ed. 1932) 
(observing this result). 
 
S18See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 147 (1998) (ties a form of 
second-degree price discrimination); see also Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 236 (2005) (same). 
 
S19On this point, see GORDON MILLS, RETAIL PRICING STRATEGIES AND MARKET POWER 26 (2002) 
(difference between second- and third-degree price discrimination is that in second-degree discrimination 
seller cannot distinguish customers into diverse groups, but rather they self-select according to a pricing 
schedule that is the same for all). 
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Price Discrimination Tie as Risk Sharing Device 
Second degree price discrimination such as occurs under a variable proportion tie 
can also confer additional value by attracting customers who are uncertain about their 
potential use. Especially for a new product or business investment, potential customers 
may readily see its utility without fully appreciating at the outset just how useful the new 
product will be. For example, a potential user of a computer or a copier might be unsure 
how much it would use the machine and would therefore be unwilling to commit itself to 
pay a substantial price or rental. The user would, however, be willing to pay a higher 
price if it turned out that it used the machine a great deal. Accordingly, the seller might 
set a relatively low base rental for those who agreed to pay an additional but contingent 
sum for each use of the machine. 
Similarly, a franchisee might be unwilling to pay a high periodic royalty fee before it 
knows if the franchise will be a great success. The franchisor might accommodate the 
franchisee with a contract requiring only a small base license fee coupled with additional 
royalty payments based on the franchisee's volume. If the franchise does not prosper, 
the franchisee is out only the small base fee; if business booms, the franchisor will reap 
a share of the franchisee's prosperity. In this way, the franchisor acquires risk-averse 
franchisees who bear relatively little downside risk if the business is only moderately 
successful.  Because the franchisor bears a great portion of the risk, it also reaps a 
greater reward if the franchisee is highly successful. 
These risk-sharing situations reflect imperfect information. At the outset of the 
transaction, neither the supplier nor the user knows whether the user will turn out to be 
a high-intensity, high-value user or not. Requiring payment according to actual use 
helps both parties deal successfully with their imperfect information.6  More generally, 
price discrimination ties serve to change the buyer’s cost structure, making relatively 
less of its investment a fixed cost that may be substantially nonrecoverable, and 
relatively more a variable cost.  In an extreme case the manufacturer of a costly piece of 
durable hardware may supply it at no cost to the user, and earn its entire markup on tied 
supplies. 
Price Discrimination Ties and Alternative “Metering” Devices 
There are many ways to vary the price according to each customer's intensity of use.  
A meter on a copy machine might count the number of copies made so that customers 
may be charged for each copy in addition to a fixed monthly charge. Similarly, 
franchisees often pay a percentage of their revenues as a royalty to the franchisor.7  
With meters or percentage royalties, high-volume users pay more and cannot escape 
                                               
6See Tyler A. Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 
VA. L. REV. 1235, 1280 (1980); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity and the Leverage Theory, 76 
YALE L.J. 1397, 1411 (1967). 
 
7See, e.g., Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 
970 (1981) (franchisees pay “2.2 percent of their gross receipts as royalties under the franchise agreement 
and 8 percent as rent under the lease”). 
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the discrimination by purchasing anything—machine or franchise—from the low-volume 
users who pay less. 
Variable proportion ties also serve this metering function. When high-volume users 
of product A need large quantities of complementary product B, selling or leasing A on 
condition that the customer also purchase its requirements of B at a profitable price 
from the defendant achieves price discrimination.8  Film might be tied to a traditional 
camera, paper to a copying machine, or ink cartridges to a computer printer.9 The more 
such customers use the tying product, the more they must buy of the tied product. For 
example, a manufacturer might charge a price near its costs in selling or renting a 
copying machine to those customers willing to buy their paper requirements from it. By 
setting paper prices above the competitive level, the defendant captures a little 
economic profit on each paper sale. In effect, the high-intensity user pays more for the 
machine, recognizing its greater value to it than to the low-volume user. And because 
the paper must be purchased from the machine maker at a “high” price, there is nothing 
the low-volume user can profitably resell to the high-volume user. Such price 
discrimination cannot be undermined. 
By whatever device, mechanical metering has its costs. Meters usually accompany 
products that are leased rather than sold and thus imply that the supplier bears the 
capital cost of continuing to own the machines used by others.10 The supplier also bears 
the costs of designing, installing, inspecting, maintaining, and reading the meter. These 
costs might be prohibitive when the meter is unreliable, or difficult to maintain,11 or 
requires visits to read that are unduly expensive in relation to value.  For example, it is 
quite cheap for a car rental company to “meter” the car by reading the odometer, 
because the car comes equipped with this device anyway, and the odometer is read 
when the driver returns the car; so the incremental cost of reading the meter is very low.  
However, metering a home use printer or camera could impose significant additional 
costs in relation to the value of the product. 
Similarly, revenue-based royalties require difficult and costly monitoring of the 
                                               
8If the market price of the tied product is already supracompetitive because of insufficient 
competition in the tied market, the tying seller gains more excess profit by forcing the tied customers to 
take that product from it rather than from its competitors. 
 
9E.g., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (tie of ink to printer 
head) (to the extent it is relevant, HH was consulted by the defendant); Static Control Components, Inc. v. 
Lexmark Intern., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (ink cartridges to computer printer); see also 
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (franchisee must buy paper plates from franchisor at premium 
price in lieu of franchise fee, which was zero). 
10Because greater use may wear out the machine faster, varying the rental fee with use can also reflect 
depreciation independently of discrimination. 
 
11See, e.g., Mid-America ICEE v. John E. Mitchell Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. ¶74,681 at 94,987 n.23 (D. 
Or.) (the meter did not work effectively with all products passing through the machine; servicing 
triggered it, and its delicacy meant frequent maladjustment). 
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franchisee's accounts. Such costs can be larger or smaller than the costs of buying or 
producing and handling the tied supplies and monitoring the customer to detect its 
purchases of the tied product from other sources. In some instances, there may be no 
effective alternative at all. 
Consider, for example, the defendant manufacturer who requires franchised dealers 
to use only its “genuine” repair parts.12 Although the manufacturer insists that only those 
parts guarantee proper functioning of the machine and thereby protect the 
manufacturer's reputation, price discrimination may be the object when its price exceeds 
any real quality premium over rival repair parts. In that event, those who need more 
repair parts because they use the machine more intensively—for example, drive a car 
farther or over more years—presumably value it more highly and effectively pay more 
for it than those who use it less. Without inducing the dealers performing a substantial 
portion of those repairs to use “genuine” parts, the defendant may have great difficulty 
in obtaining the postulated premium on those parts. 
No Shift from Higher Value to Lower Value Customers 
Nonforeclosing ties, which are tying arrangements that do not cause harm by 
excluding rivals, may extract higher prices from some customers, but the case for 
condemning them on that ground is very weak.S1 The means of extraction is usually a 
form of price discrimination, and the typical result is that, while some consumers are 
harmed, others will benefit. While some instances of price discrimination reduce welfare 
or result in higher consumer prices in the aggregate, most do not and segregating the 
two sets is extremely difficult.  Many, if not most, variable proportion ties encountered in 
antitrust cases probably increase output, which makes a broad rule condemning them 
unwise. This is particularly likely to be true if a tying arrangement involves a lower price 
in the tying product, where the dominant firm has power, and a transfer of at least a 
portion of the monopoly overcharge to the tied product.  The great majority of variable 
ties undoubtedly fall into this class.  
While the economic literature on price discrimination and tying focuses on 
monopolists, many challenged ties occur in markets where the defendant has no more 
market power than generally results from product differentiation. Indeed, most franchise 
ties, which are variable proportion, occur in competitive albeit product differentiated 
markets.S3 In those cases, a tie that includes a substantial price reduction in the tying 
                                               
12See 9 ANTITRUST ¶1716c. 
 
S1For a contrary view, see Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L.REV. 397 (2009); Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of 
Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1036 
(1987). 
 
S3See, e.g., Kypta v. McDonald’s Corp., 671 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1982) (fast food; hamburgers and 
related products; tying of lease of location); Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1059 (1998) (pizza; tying of pizza dough, a commodity made of flour, oil, 
salt and water); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (fast-food fried chicken; 
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product can increase the number of tying product sales significantly.  For example, a 
franchisor may offer a very low entry price for its franchise, thus reducing franchisee risk 
and inducing many more franchisees to invest, but then tie various commodities or 
products that are used by the franchisee in proportion to its sales.  The true monopoly 
case is the rare, but hardly unheard of, worst case scenario. 
One unfortunate consequence of the historical per se rule against tiesS8 is that 
questions about how price discrimination works in tying arrangements are irrelevant, as 
are questions about the impact of the tie on output. As a result, antitrust litigation has 
not made records on these issues and we know much less about them than we should.  
However, a nonforeclosing tie that involves a price reduction in the tying product, as 
most probably do, increases consumer access to that product. Variable proportion ties 
that involve reduced tying product prices generally serve to do two things. First, they 
change the purchaser’s cost structure by giving it lower fixed costs but higher variable 
costs. For example, to the purchaser the printer is a fixed cost but the ink is a variable 
cost. A printer/cartridge tie that involves lower printer prices but higher ink prices serves 
to bring more printer customers into the market, although it also distorts usage 
decisions at the margin, because the ink price is higher. In addition, the increase in the 
seller output of printers can reduce production costs substantially if a significant 
proportion of printer design and production costs are fixed. 
Variable proportion ties have been attacked on the premise that they “reallocat[e] 
output from high-value buyers to low value buyers.”  But the argument is based on the 
premise that they are a form of third-degree price discrimination or that the difference 
between second- and third-degree price discrimination is merely “semantics.”S9 That 
premise can then lead to the conclusion that variable proportion ties reduce consumer 
welfare even if they increase output, because the increased output accrues to 
consumers who place a lower value on the tied product (or the tying-tied combination), 
while higher prices and possible reduced output accrues to other higher-value 
consumers. 
As noted above, however, the argument has no application to second-degree price 
discrimination, which covers all ties in which tying and tied product are offered at the 
same nominal price to all customers.19  To be sure, some ties may also contain 
attributes of third-degree price discrimination, but they would have to be more complex 
than the ordinary tie. For example, a manufacturer of printers and ink might tie printers 
                                                                                                                                                       
tying of spices and supplies); Little Caesar Enter., Inc. v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Mi. 1998) 
(pizza; tying of paper plates and other products bearing franchisor’s logo). 
 
S8See 9 ANTITRUST ¶1720. 
 
S9Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, 123 HARV. L. REV. at 431 & n.89. 
 
19 Note that the argument might apply to other types of vertical restraints, such as vertical customer 
division or field of use restrictions in IP.  For example, a supplier or segregates dealers serving businesses 
from those that serve homeowners may be engaging in third degree price discrimination.  In general, this 
has not been a rationale for condemning either vertical restraints or field-of-use restrictions. 
 
Hovenkamp                                                  Tying, Leverage, Foreclosure                                             March, 2011, page 18 
 
 
 
and ink but also charge a higher price for either or both products to commercial users 
than to home users. In that case the printer/ink tie would be an instance of second-
degree price discrimination, while the differential price to commercial and home users 
would be an instance of third-degree price discrimination. 
To be sure, second-degree price discrimination may lead to its own distortions from 
perfect competition, but they are much different distortions than third-degree price 
discrimination encounters, and there is at least as much reason for thinking that they 
“distort” the dominant firm’s output back toward the competitive level rather than vice-
versa. The one problem second-degree price discrimination does not typically 
encounter is the discontinuities in marginal substitution that are characteristic of third-
degree discrimination.  For example, if first-class flying is too straining on a person’s 
budget as she does it more frequently, she is always free to shift part or all of her 
purchases to coach class. As the number of classifications in a second-degree price 
discrimination scheme is increased, the scheme comes closer to approximating first-
degree, or “perfect,” price discrimination, under which each individual customer pays his 
or her reservation price and output increases toward the competitive level.S16 In 
practice, few second-degree schemes reach anything close to that level of 
classification. However, variable proportion ties theoretically permit an infinite number of 
degrees depending on the number of tied units a purchaser buys. 
At the same time, most variable proportion ties do not constitute first-degree price 
discrimination.   While a well-executed printer/ink tie could accurately make prices 
proportional to the number of copies a person prints, it could not control for the fact that 
different purchasers place different values on each individual copy. For example, both a 
law firm drafting legal opinions on securities offerings and a printer of handbills about 
garage sales might print 1,000 pages weekly. As a result, if they purchased under the 
same tying arrangement they would pay the same amount per print. But given what is at 
stake, the law firm might value the printouts at many dollars per page, while the handbill 
printer values them at only a few cents. The variable proportion tie will not capture these 
differences in valuation and will thus permit at least some consumers to retain 
surpluses.  In order to capture more, the printer maker would additionally have to 
engage in third degree discrimination as between the law firm and the handbill printer. 
These facts suggest that most variable proportion tying arrangements are benign 
without even considering production or distribution cost savings, including economies of 
joint provision or improved quality control that independently justify ties. Further, even a 
variable proportion tie that reduces output cannot be shown to reduce welfare except in 
the unusual case where no customer benefits from the tie.S27 
                                               
S16Pigou, Economics of Welfare at II.17.11: 
It is readily seen that the effects of monopoly plus discrimination of the 
second degree approximate towards those of monopoly plus discrimination of the 
first degree, as the number of different prices, which it is possible for the 
monopolist to charge, increases; just as the area of a polygon inscribed in a circle 
approximates to the area of the circle as the number of its sides increases. . . . 
S27See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Competitive Harm, 52 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 925 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284.. 
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Finally, the economies that can result from such ties are pervasive and can be 
substantial, thus explaining the wide variety of ties that exist in competitively structured 
markets, including those for franchises and computer printers.S28   For example, the 
higher output that results from lower tying product prices can also produce lower costs 
ifa significant portion of tying product production costs are fixed.  As a result, the core 
concern of exclusive dealing and tying-arrangement analysis is not leverage. Rather, it 
remains concerned principally with the unreasonable exclusion of rivals, which is also 
the core concern of §2 of the Sherman Act. That statute does not reach simple output 
reducing practices. But market exclusion is unlikely to result from practices imposed by 
a single firm unless it meets the market-share standards ordinarily required for unlawful 
monopolization. 
Package Pricing Under Differential Customer Demand 
Ties might be used in yet other ways to aid price discrimination. For example, a 
package price might enable a supplier to maximize revenues when it cannot practicably 
discriminate in price but its customers place differential values on the components in the 
package. 22  This type of price discrimination applies even to fixed proportion ties.  
However, as in that case, it does not offer an independent ground for antitrust 
condemnation (although a tie that discriminates in this way might incidentally cause 
anticompetitive foreclosure).  Indeed, such a practice can be output increasing and 
actually improve consumer welfare, depending on the nature of customer demand. 
 To illustrate, suppose a monopolist has two products, Alpha and Beta and that their 
costs of production are zero. Two customers want both products and are willing to pay 
more than cost, but their willingness to pay varies between the two, according to the 
following schedule: 
 
 Willingness to pay 
 Alpha Beta 
Customer 1 10 5 
Customer 2 3 11 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
S28On the sources of cost savings and product improvement that results from ties, see 9 ANTITRUST 
¶¶1712–1718. 
 
22See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 165-166 (1968); George J. Stigler, 
United States v. Loew's, Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152 (1963). Such packaging 
is sometimes referred to as “simulated” price discrimination because it does not involve true price 
discrimination at all, but only the sale of a package to two different buyers at the same price where the 
buyers place different values on different elements of the package. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §10.6e (4th ed. 2011); William James 
Adams & Janet L. Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475 (1976). 
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In this case the optimal strategy for the dominant firm is to package the two products 
together at a price of 14, and sell both products to both customers. The seller’s surplus 
is 28. Customer 1’s surplus is 1; customer 2’s surplus is 0. 
Now suppose that tying and bundled discounting are forbidden, which means 
that the seller must set a price for Alpha and Beta individually. One choice would be for 
the seller to set a price of 10 for Alpha and 11 for Beta. In that case only customer 1 
would purchase Alpha and only customer 2 would purchase Beta. So the seller’s 
surplus would be 21; and the customer’s surplus would be 0. 
Alternatively, the seller could charge a price of 3 for Alpha and 5 for Beta. In this 
case both customers would purchase both products. The seller’s surplus would be 16. 
Customer 1 would have a consumer surplus of 7 and customer 2 would have a 
consumer surplus of 6. Total consumer surplus would be 13. 
But the important thing to note in this case is that if tying were not an option a 
rational seller would take the first choice above, giving itself returns of 21 and customers 
a surplus of zero. If bundling were permitted, though, the seller’s returns would increase 
to 28, and consumers’ surplus would also increase from zero to 1. That is to say, not 
only would the tying in this case increase total welfare, it would also increase 
consumers’ surplus.  These outcomes can vary, however, and depend on the strength 
and direction of the buyers’ preferences and also on the seller’s costs.20 
To be sure, we might prefer the more “competitive” outcome in which the 
monopolist made the separate sales at the lower prices to both customers. But a 
rational seller in our example would not do that, and we could reach that outcome only if 
we not only forbad tying but also regulated the seller’s prices. So in this case a simple 
rule forbidding tying would reduce welfare (the sum of producer’s and consumers’ 
surplus) by 8 and it would also reduce consumers’ surplus by 1.  
The illustration also indicates two common themes in tying law: the first is that 
increased profits very often come from increased output. In the film example involving a 
fixed proportion tie, just as in the general discussion of variable proportion ties above, 
tying often increases output. When tying increases output of either the tying or the tied 
product then increases in both general welfare and consumer welfare are likely, 
although certainly not invariable. 
The second is that whether a particular outcome from forbidding tying increases 
or decreases total or consumer welfare depends critically on the numbers one chooses 
for the example.  In most cases tying very likely increase welfare, but in some it does 
not.  Further, the numbers are very difficult to determine in litigation and needing to 
determine them can greatly increase cost and decrease certainty. 
Should the possible detriments of price discrimination condemn a tie that is 
otherwise harmless? Should the possible benefits redeem a tie that is deemed harmful 
on independent grounds? Do such detriments or benefits bear on the wisdom of per se 
illegality for tying? 
                                               
20.Professor Elhauge gives an example in which consumers’ surplus is reduced. Elhauge, Tying, 
Bundled Discounts, 123 HARV. L. REV. at 406. 
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Price discrimination can extract more from some customers than uniform prices and 
thereby transfer income from them to the supplier, other customers, or both. Such 
transfers, however, do not warrant condemning an otherwise harmless tie, even if that 
exploitation both (1) exceeds that which would otherwise result from alternative and 
lawful vehicles of discrimination and (2) offends antitrust policy. The reasons are two. 
First, discrimination necessarily involves both higher- and lower-price customers. 
Focusing on the former's exploitation ignores the latter's gain in income. We have no 
reason to give greater weight to the former's loss more than to the latter's gain. 
To be sure, there may be cases where the loss to high-priced customers is not 
entirely offset by the gain for low-priced customers. The seller would not discriminate, 
however, unless it also gains something from it. Even so, the lesser dollar gain of the 
lower-price customers may represent greater utility, although judging interpersonal 
utilities is usually thought impossible. In any event, this issue is mooted by the next one. 
Second, a price for some customers that is below the uniform price that would 
otherwise prevail ordinarily brings greater use by them and thus moves production 
toward the competitive level,27 overshadowing any redistribution of income away from 
high-value users. Consumers as a class enjoy a net benefit when increased use and 
production result from price discrimination. 
We saw earlier that production and use are likely to rise in the frequent case of price 
discrimination according to intensity of use. Although other forms of price discrimination 
are more ambiguous in their effects and might sometimes depress production and use,  
we cannot say that they usually or generally do so. Because this adverse possibility 
cannot be said to be more frequent than expansion of production and use toward the 
competitive level, it does not itself support a general condemnation of tie-ins. 
The same agnosticism that rejects price discrimination as grounds for condemnation 
also rejects its use-expanding potential as an affirmative defense to a tie that is 
otherwise proven harmful. Economic theory does not allow us to say that price 
discrimination always increases use and production, and exploring the effects of a 
particular discrimination is too likely to be inconclusive. Moreover, disallowing the 
defense need not prevent beneficial price discrimination, which can often(though not 
always) be achieved via lawful alternative methods.30 As a result, we would not permit 
price discrimination to be used as a defense to a tie that is genuinely shown to be 
anticompetitive under the rule of reason. 
                                               
27While greater physical output of, say, copying machines is easy to see, a more widely used franchise 
also increases the units sold under it and thus benefits consumers in the same way. 
30See, e.g., Mid-America ICEE v. John E.Mitchell Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. ¶74,681, 94,987-94,988 & 
n.24. The court was satisfied that the defendant “had no anticompetitive intent…. Its main purpose was to 
establish an efficient meter price system; this was the simplest one it knew of.” Moreover, as the court 
acknowledged, “Meter pricing itself serves the useful function of permitting royalties to vary with [the 
franchisee's] income.” Nevertheless, the court held the tie illegal because less restrictive alternatives were 
available to accomplish the same purpose. Admitting the absence of any substantial effect in the tied 
product market, it believed that such an effect was “irrelevant” under existing law. 
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However, in the case of nonforeclosing ties,31 where harm to competition is not 
proven but merely inferred under the per se rule from a substantial volume of tied-
product commerce,32 a showing of price discrimination and presumptively increased 
output should serve to defend the tie.33 
Relevance of Lawful Alternatives 
Price discrimination need not depend upon tying. Instead of requiring users of 
copying machines to buy their paper from the machine maker at an elevated price, the 
machine maker might simply attach a meter that counted every copy made by the 
machine. Instead of requiring a fast-food franchisee to buy high-priced paper plates to 
measure patronage, the franchisor can base its fee on the franchisee's revenues. Such 
lawful alternatives are relevant in several ways. First, they demonstrate that antitrust law 
is frequently indifferent to price discrimination, at least when achieved without tying. 
Whether such indifference to non-tying discrimination amounts to affirmative approval or 
not, it means that the extent of price discrimination will be largely unaffected by the law 
of tying. When tying is forbidden, similar discrimination will typically be practiced by 
other and lawful means. It follows that price discrimination should be deemed neither an 
independent basis for condemning an otherwise lawful tie-in nor a redeeming virtue for 
otherwise unlawful tying. That is, even if price discrimination were regarded as evil, it 
would not be significantly reduced by condemning tying. Similarly, outlawing otherwise 
unlawful tying would not sacrifice the potential procompetitive benefits of price 
discrimination, which can be achieved mainly by other and lawful means. 
Notwithstanding some qualifications in the following elaboration, this reasoning 
reinforces the conclusion that price discrimination's effects are not sufficiently assured 
either to condemn an otherwise lawful tie or to save an otherwise unlawful tie. 
By permitting so much price discrimination in so many contexts—for example, the 
metered machine or percentage-of-revenue franchise fee as well as the tie—has 
antitrust law affirmatively approved price discrimination as either harmless or even 
beneficial? An affirmative answer is supported by the proposition that firms with lawfully 
obtained market power may charge whatever the traffic will bear. On the other hand, the 
cases reveal neither express reasoning nor much analysis of a firm's price 
discrimination. Some judges have simply assumed that price discrimination via tying is 
undesirable23 and thus may believe that the law's relative indifference to non-tying 
discrimination reflects a lacuna in statutory coverage. Sherman Act §2 reaches only the 
single firm that is an actual or prospective monopolist whose conduct helps create or 
maintain that market power.24 Even if that were the exclusive focus of Sherman Act §2, 
it would not necessarily validate tying agreements that are covered by §1 or Clayton Act 
§3 and that might be forbidden without requiring the courts to examine particular prices 
or their effects. 
                                               
31See 9 ANTITRUST ¶1725. 
32See id. at ¶1721. 
33See 10 ANTITRUST ¶1763a. 
23See 9 ANTITRUST ¶1710b. 
24See 3 ANTITRUST ¶650. 
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Thus, although we believe that price discrimination should not itself be grounds for 
condemning tying, we cannot say that the law's relative indifference to most 
discrimination amounts to affirmative approval of price discrimination as legitimate and 
procompetitive. Nevertheless, we can say that antitrust law has not deemed 
discrimination so evil as relentlessly to prevent it. And we should recall that precedent 
has primarily emphasized substantial foreclosure and increased entry barriers—rather 
than increased profit or possible exploitation of some customers—as the evil addressed 
by anti-tying law.25 
Whether feared or blessed, discrimination can neither condemn nor save tying when 
equivalent non-tying discrimination would replace the tie. In that event, outlawing the tie 
stops neither good nor bad discrimination. We presume that equivalent lawful 
discrimination is available, as in the metered machine or percentage-of-revenue 
franchise illustrations. 
However, the lawful alternative might be more expensive to administer or less 
effective. In that event, condemning the tie might prevent discrimination's detriments or 
sacrifice its benefits. As noted before, it may require fewer resources to monitor a fast-
food franchisee's purchase of cheaper paper plates from other sources than to 
determine the accuracy of its revenue accounts. Similarly, fewer resources may be 
needed to monitor a customer's purchase of supplies from others than to install, secure, 
maintain, and read a meter on a machine. Condemning such ties may simply lead to the 
substitution of the more expensive alternative, thus wasting social resources without 
ending any undesirable discrimination. It seems unwise to force the seller to adopt 
alternatives wasting resources or achieving fewer benefits without eliminating any 
detriments. 
On the other hand, a lesser degree of discrimination might reduce whatever 
detriments are thought to be present. Indeed, the alternatives might be so much more 
expensive or less effective than the tie that the tieless seller simply charges a uniform 
price—thus stopping both good and bad discriminations. Notwithstanding those 
possibilities, it is probably impractical to vary the disposition of particular cases with 
predictions about the cost and utility of lawful alternative means of discrimination 
relative to the discrimination's effects. The alternatives cannot be assumed to be inferior 
merely because the defendant chose to adopt the tie. The defendant might have 
overlooked the alternatives or simply judged them no better (rather than inferior), or 
sought some objective beyond price discrimination. So long as a tie sacrifices no 
revenue, the defendant may choose the tie rather than an equivalent alternative in the 
hope, however remote, that it might possibly impair competition in the tied market or 
obstruct entry into the tying market. 
Although the relative harms and benefits of alternative means of discrimination might 
be canvassed in each lawsuit, reliable conclusions will be rare, especially for 
discriminations involving different end uses of the tying product. Fortunately, we do not 
need to make such a canvass or adopt working presumptions about the adequacy of 
alternatives when the possible benefits or detriments of discrimination neither save an 
                                               
25See 9 ANTITRUST ¶1710. 
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otherwise harmful tie nor condemn an otherwise harmless one. 
Conclusion: the Compelling Case Against Tying’s Per Se Rule 
 At this writing some 35 years have passed since Fortner II21 and more 25 years since Jefferson 
Parish.22  That seems long enough to endure recognition that an antitrust rule is no longer serving its 
purpose. When the concern is foreclosure, application of the rule of reason is clearly called for.  
Assessment of foreclosure requires determining the extent of any exclusion, and this requires a market 
definition.23  The appropriate foreclosure analysis in tying cases is not materially different than in 
exclusive dealing cases.  In exclusive dealing the complaint is that rivals are excluded from access to a 
particular dealer or set of dealers.  In tying the complaint is most typically that rivals in the tied market 
are foreclosed from tied product sales within that market.  The Supreme Court recognized the need for 
market analysis already in its Tampa24 decision, and the courts have always applied a full rule of reason 
inquiry into exclusive dealing.25 
 
 Recent attempts in the scholarly literature to defend a per se rule have been based almost 
exclusively on concerns about leverage, or extraction of higher profits from consumers aside from any 
foreclosure possibility.  The arguments for per se, or quasi per se, illegality rest on some subset of the 
following propositions, which were discussed in greater detail earlier:  First, that there are instances in 
which a firm can extract additional profits from the customer by tying two products together.26  Second, 
that output is rarely increased by tying, mainly because the tying product price is not reduced or may even 
be increased; or alternatively, that output effects are unimportant and in any event are offset by the fact 
that ties reallocate “some output to buyers who put less value on it.”27  Third, that double marginalization 
does not occur or can be safely ignored.28  Fourth, that cost savings or product or service impovement are 
not primary motives for tying, and are thus best considered only as a defense. 
 
 On the first proposition, while the critique of the tying “leverage” theory remains robust,29 some 
instances of tying do have the result that some customers pay higher prices.  This is particularly true of 
variable proportion ties in which high intensity users of the tied product pay more for the combination as 
                                               
21 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
22 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
23 See 9 Antitrust Law ¶1704. 
24 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).   See 11 Antitrust Law ¶1801i; on 
Tampa’s relevance to tying foreclosure, see 9 Antitrust Law ¶1709c3. 
25 See 11 Antitrust Law ¶1820. 
26 See 9 Antitrust Law ¶¶1700d1, 1710.  See also id., ¶1701b.  While the Motion Picture Patents case 
discussed in ¶1701b spoke of leverage the real concern in that decision was foreclosure.  And see ¶1706 
(leveraging of sequential monopolies). 
27 Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 
123 Harv.L.Rev. 397, 405 (2009).  See also id. at 430-434.  And see Nicholas Economides, Tying, 
Bundling, and Loyalty/Requirement Rebates, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law 
(Einer Elhauge, ed., 2011). 
28 For example, neither Elhauge, id. nor Economides, id., discuss double marginalization as a 
rationale for tying or bundling.  For further development, see 9 Antitrust Law ¶¶1704c4, 1712; and Erik 
N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Competitive Harm, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 
925, 958-963 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284.  In the 
context of vertical integration by the monopolist, see 3B Antitrust Law ¶758; in the context of vertical 
mergers, see 4A Antitrust Law ¶1022. 
29 See 9 Antitrust Law ¶1711. 
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a result of the redistribution of prices that the tying involves.30  However, in most of these cases the tying 
arrangement brings many new customers into the market and results in lower prices for the lower use 
customers.  Further, in the great majority of cases the gains experienced by the gainers are greater than the 
losses suffered by the losers.31  Even in these cases, the proposition that some customers suffer losses 
depends on an assumption that neither the elimination of double marginalization, discussed below, nor the 
creation of production scale economies is sufficient to offset the higher prices. 
 
 Second, output effects strongly weigh in favor of presumptive legality and rule of reason 
treatment.  One unfortunate consequence of the per se rule, however, is that price changes and output 
effects that result from a tie have not been relevant to questions of legality.  As a result the decisions 
typically do not mention them.  Occasional decisions do, however, and with no exceptions of which we 
are aware these cases state that as a consequence of the tie the defendant reduced the price of the tying 
product from its standalone profit maximizing level, often dramatically, sometimes to below cost, and 
sometimes even to zero.32  The result is that more of the tying product is sold, and in some cases much 
more, depending on the elasticities of demand.  When a customer is brought into this market who was not 
in it under separate sales, its purchases are a pure consumer gain, even at a higher price for the tied 
product.33  Further, some lower intensity customers gain even if they had purchased previously, because 
the price cut in the tying product is more than enough to offset the price increase in the tied product.34  
Some of the courts have recognized this by denying damages to tying customers who cannot showed that 
the sum of the two prices they paid under tying is greater than the separate product prices.35 
 
 To illustrate these effects, imagine that a franchisor could maximize its profits by charging a 
$20,000 annual fixed franchise fee and permitting all consumables to be sold at the market price, which 
we presume to be competitive.36  In that case 50 franchisees would sign up.  The franchisor could also 
charge a $10,000 annual franchise fee but sell one or more consumables at a higher-than-market price.  
The lower fee would induce 50 additional franchisees, or a total of 100, to sign up.  Among these 
franchisees, some of the 50 original ones (“high volume” franchisees) end up paying more because their 
annual use of the consumables exceeds $10,000.  Others of the 50 original franchisees (“medium 
volume”) pay less, however, because the increment in consumable prices is less than $10,000 and they are 
thus better off as a result of the tying product price reduction.  The 50 “new” franchisees (“low volume”) 
would not have been in the market at all under the single monopoly price.  Their gains are a pure 
consumer welfare improvement.  In sum, two groups of franchisees (low volume and medium volume) 
gain, while a third group (high volume) is worse off.  The franchisor profits from the high and low 
volume franchisees, but loses on the medium volume franchisees.  Under most realistic assumptions both 
economic welfare and consumer welfare are increased. 
 
                                               
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.; and see Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp Article, 52 Ariz. L.Rev. at 928-945. 
32 The cases are collected and discussed in 9 Antitrust Law ¶1711b1.  See also Erik Hovenkamp & 
Herbert Hovenkamp Article, 52 Ariz. L.Rev. at 939-944 & notes. 
33 Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Id. 
34 Ibid. 
35 E.g.,  Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 1982) (injury must be shown by 
reference to overcharge in sum of tying and tied product, not by overcharge in tied product alone). 
36 This assumption avoids concerns about double marginalization, which do not generally apply if one 
of the two goods is sold under competition.  See 9 Antitrust Law ¶1712. 
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 Such arrangements exist across the full range of market structures, from absolutely monopolized 
to highly competitive.37  Both dominant and nondominant firms use ties.  As a result monopolizing cannot 
be the only explanation of such tying and is not very likely an important explanation at all.  When a 
practice increases output the inference of consumer benefit must be regarded as very strong. 
 
 To be sure, one cannot rule out the possibility that some ties reduce output, most likely because 
they are accompanied by price increases in the tying product, or at least by prices that are not changed.  
The literature on bundled discounts does hypothesize situations in which bundling is accompanied by a 
price increase in the primary product.  But in those cases the cause of the harm is foreclosure, or 
exclusion, rather than monopoly.38  In any event, contractual ties do not have an analogue. 
 
 One argument against some types of price discrimination is that it can reallocate output from 
higher value to lower value consumers, and this would constitute a form of injury.  This type of 
redistribution occurs when a seller segregates two or more groups of customers a priori and sells to them 
at different prices.  For example, suppose that the seller segregates commercial and residential users, 
charging the first $100 and the second $60 per unit.39  A commercial buyer willing to pay $99 will be 
turned away, while a residential purchaser willing to pay $61 will be served.  This characteristic of “third 
degree” price discrimination entails that such discrimination schemes cannot increase welfare unless they 
also increase output.40  Tying arrangements, however, are an instance of “second degree” price 
discrimination in which a common set of prices and terms are announced in advance and customers select 
how much they want to purchase.41  Such arrangement do cause a deviation from perfect competition to 
the extent that all buyers pay less than the standalone price for one product and more for a different one; 
but there is no transfer from higher value to lower value purchasers.  For example, if a printer 
manufacturer ties by dropping the price of a printer by $100 and increasing the price of cartridges by $10 
to a price of $25, then each customer will purchase cartridges until the value she places on the next 
cartridge falls to $25.  At the margin each customer will obtain the same value. 
 
 Third, the probability of double marginalization must be taken into account anytime a tie joins 
two markets in which prices are above costs.  Some tying cases have involved tied commodities, such as 
ink or salt, that were sold in highly competitive markets.  In these cases tying is not likely to produce 
significant savings from the avoidance of market power in the secondary market.  But many other cases, 
often in higher technology markets, cannot be so characterized.  Further, the price discrimination 
explanation for tying does not depend on the existence of double marginalization. 
 
                                               
37 See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (competitively structured fast 
food market in which defendant franchisor was a minor player).  On the necessity of market power in the 
tying product, see 10 Antitrust Law, Ch. 17C. 
38 See, e.g.,  Patrick Greenlee, David Reitman & David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled 
Loyalty Discounts, 26 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 1132, 1137 (2008); Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 
Antitrust Bull. 321, 324-327 (2005); and see Antitrust Law ¶749d7 (supp.). 
39 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (licensing of technology to 
produce sound amplifiers at different rates to producers for commercial use and for home use); ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (licensing of database to commercial and residential users at 
different rates). See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Maryland L. Rev. 616 
(2008). 
40 See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp Article, 52 Ariz.L.Rev. at 934. 
41 Other common examples are quantity discounts or price gradations by customer-chosen classes of 
service.  See id. 
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 In the tying context, double marginalization occurs when two firms make complementary goods 
(such as a printer and ink cartridge, or a stereo and speaker set) and each of them has some power over 
price.  The markets need not be monopolized, but they must exhibit prices above the competitive level 
such as characterize an oligopoly.  In that case each firm selling only one of the two goods will set a price 
that is “too high” in relation to the price being set by the complementary good.  If the two firms were able 
to bargain with each other they would each increase output and offer a lower joint price, but only if each 
could be assured of selling the companion to the sale that the other made at the lower price.42 
 
 To take a simplified illustration, ¶758 showed the impact of double marginalization in vertical 
distribution when the upstream firm (“manufacturer”) is a monopolist.  As a variation, suppose that a 
manufacturer of stereos sells them at $300 each to a dealer who adds speakers and sells them to 
customers.  The competitive markup for adding speakers and retailing the units is $100, but in this case 
the dealer charges $200.  At that price the stereo manufacturer is losing money because its output is too 
low.   The example illustrates the high degree of artificiality in our distinction between vertical and 
complementary relationships: if the stereo manufacturer sells to the dealer, who adds speakers and resells 
to customers, we describe this relationship as “vertical.”  By contrast, if the first firm makes stereos and 
the second firm makes speakers and each sells to customers who use them in pairs, then the relationship is 
regarded as complementary.  The economic analysis does not differ significantly, however.  In this case, 
the stereo manufacturer maximizes its output and profits when the speaker markup is competitive.  Faced 
with excessive markups in speakers, the stereo maker would have an incentive to make and add its own 
speakers, increasing output to the single-monopoly level and reducing prices.  Alternatively, the stereo 
maker and speaker maker might agree on the single monopoly price and output, which would be a lower 
price for consumers and a higher output for each of them. 
 
However, in both the case where the stereo maker entered the speaker market and the case in 
which it reached an agreement with an independent speaker maker, the profitability of the arrangement 
would depend on the sales of stereo-plus-speaker as a package.  Just as in the purely vertical arrangement, 
joint maximization and the lower prices that result occur only when a single firm sells in both markets 
itself or the two firms coordinate their output and sell together.  A bundled discount typically achieves 
this result; by selling the bundle in a single transaction the seller eliminates double marginalization and 
thus maximizes its profits at a lower price.43 
 
 Finally, the importance of cost savings or improved product or services cannot be underestimated.  
Indeed, this is an important reason that tying is so ubiquitous in competitive as well as noncompetitive 
markets.  The fact is that most of the litigated ties over the past century have not involved monopolists, 
and many have involved firms in quite competitive markets.  The lengthy Paragraphs on defenses in this 
book offer a survey of the cases, with the explanations of joint cost savings and quality control tending to 
dominate.44 
 
 In sum, tying is not even arguably in the range of “naked” practices whose profitability depends 
on market power.45  Even in the case of a tying monopolist, the tie most typically serves to increase output 
via price discrimination.  Otherwise it is used to control the double marginalization that occurs when 
firms in the secondary market have power as well.  And the defenses of production or distribution cost 
savings or product improvement apply just as much to monopolist as to competitors.  When the tying firm 
is not a monopolist, as has been true in most cases, the rationales for presuming harm are even weaker. 
                                               
42 See 9 Antitrust Law ¶1712. 
43 See 3A & 3B Antitrust Law ¶¶749, 758. 
44 See 9 Antitrust Law ¶¶1716-1717 (on the rationales); and ¶¶1761-1762 (raised as defenses). 
45 See 11 Aantitrust Law ¶1906. 
